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Abstract 
Although the history of U.S. drone strikes on Pakistan is not so long, which was began since 2004 and is still 
continue but it have complicated narrative. Strikes by drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are the key 
tools used by the U.S. in “War on Terror” to combat with Al Qaida and Taliban particularly in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Though the history and narrative of drone strikes in Pakistan has been examined by various 
scholars and historians but numerous questions are still obscure. In particular, what is the U.S. drone policy 
towards drone strikes under the umbrella of counterterrorism? Which was the U.S. drone strikes legality towards 
Pakistan? What were the drone strikes implications on Pakistan from 2004 to present date? Answering these 
questions, not only will the history of drone and beginning of strikes be examined in this study but also intends 
to analyze the narrative of drone strikes in Pakistan. The study has been distributed into three parts. In first part 
of study, we will focus on drone technology and historical overview of drone strikes. Second part will be 
discussed on U.S. policies towards drone strikes and it’s implicit for international law, especially in the realm of 
law of global human rights; Legitimacy of United States drone attacks in Pakistan and Pak-U.S. internal 
narrative on drone strikes. About the drone strikes effects (from 2004 to present) on Pakistan (i.e. drone strikes 
and terrorists, revenge by militants, its economical, psychological, social and political effects on Pakistan) will 
be discussed in third part of study.      
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       Don't hit someone else's door with a 
       finger because your door might be 
       hit with a fist.  
          Dari Proverb 
 
1. Introduction 
The militants attacks that destroyed the United States World Trade Center and scratched the Pentagon triggered 
the most dramatic and rapid change in the history of U.S. Foreign Policies. On September 10, 2001, there was a 
slightest hint that the U.S. was about to embark on an all-out operations and campaign against terrorism. Thus 
the President of U.S. has declared that they should fight the “war on terrorism” and use any kind of sources and 
actions against terrorism. The U.S. quickly traced the attacks of Taliban and network of Al Qaeda which was led 
by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and U.S. has decided to military operations and drone strikes against them.  
Over a decade, the using of UAV technology generally referred to as attacks by drone or UAV are the major 
strategies carried out by the U.S. for killings of militants both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The discerned 
achievement of the drone strikes have lead to an extensive growing in using of drone’s strikes as a tactical 
weapon of the United States military and it’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) around the global (Miller, 2011). 
In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the targets are basically Al Qaeda and the leaders of Taliban in Northeast region of 
Pakistan. Though from 2004 to present date various Al Qaida and Taliban’s central members have been targeted 
by drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also the using of drone in Pakistan is rejected by the 
population of Pakistan due to “collateral" citizen’s victims and other various damages and these damages 
frequently connected with drone strikes.  
2. Drone Technology - Historical Overview 
2.1 Drone Technology 
Drone is Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV), remotely controlled and in real time controlled by human operators 
(Melzer, 2013). Which are mostly called “PRAS” (Piloted Remotely Aircraft Systems): They are robot aircrafts 
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flown and controlled by ground based pilots, although in-country or from the U.S.A or another third world 
country, and current advancement in technology of war fighting,  separating the fighter of war from the costs of 
his actions by hundred miles (Webb et al, 2010). Apparently, there are several kinds of drones in global which 
are different in shape, cost, size, capability and weight (Melzer, 2013). As per North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) classification and categorization table of UAV: some drones weight start only from 2 kg to until 600 kg 
and these drones can fly from 200 feet to 65,000 feet (NATO, 2010).  
2.2 Usage of Drones 
First time in history, the UAV was used in second decade of twenty century, when the creator and entrepreneur of 
automatic pilot airplane and tool of gyroscope depressed a Ceremony battleship by an autopilot airplane 
(Dempsey, 2010). In Vietnam War drone were also used for the purpose of survey (Newcome, 2004). Drones 
have led of gathering of valuable and significant intelligence without any human life risk (Nagl et al, 2008). 
Intelligence gathered by UAV can be evaluate in instantaneous situation by the number of players, as well as 
armed leaders, leading to a latent development in accountability and transparency of the process of decision 
making, mostly if the Drones (UAV) have attack ability and the use of that ability is being contemplated (Beard, 
2009). The drones have two generations, first generation is known exclusively and entirely for surveillance. 
Second generation is used for attacks capability.  
U.S.A and Israel have most advancement in drone technology while other countries are trying to rapid and swift 
developments in the same field (Wan, 2011). The first two stages of drone have prime role in current drone 
environment (Mayer, 2009). Drone was also used by U.S.A in 1950s as practice of targeted. In 1960s, drones 
were used over China and Vietnam for spy purpose and also in Kosovo and Bosnia for surveillance purpose in 
1990s (Webb, 2010). Israel used the drone for reconnaissance and surveillance in 1982 and in 1996 to guided 
pilot fighter bombers for targeting (Cole, 2010). Though technology have been earlier developed and drone are 
most used as weapon more than surveillance and they are much linked with 9/11 attacks on America. First time 
drone missile was fired by U.S. in Afghanistan (Cole, 2010). United States particularly Bush government 
originate great value in drone and attacks on terrorists especially on Al Qaida in various countries including 
Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan (Rona , 2003).  
3. Drone Policy, Legitimacy and Internal Narrative on Drone Strikes in Pakistan 
3.1 U.S. Drone Strikes Policies, International Law, Human Rights  
Drones strikes have turned into a key policy tool in U.S.A’s counterterrorism policy. In at minimal five states –
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq and U.S. drones’ surveillance in the skies and occasionally 
strikes are used to attacks on terrorists. Furthermore, drone strike became the major issue to debate within policy 
maker community not only in U.S but also in Pakistan (American Security Project, 2014). 
Micah Zenko gave the comments in Council Special Report on drone strike and the U.S. work worldwide to 
establish rules and norms governing the using of drone strikes. He also discussed the issues in United States on 
Drone Strike. He stated:- 
“There are four critical issues confronting U.S. drone strike policies: coordination with broader U.S. 
foreign policy objectives, signature strikes and civilian casualties, transparency and oversight, and legality 
(Zenko, 2013).” 
Furthermore, Micah Zenko pointed out that, while refinement in United States drone attacks policies are 
complicated and can need sophisticated consideration for balance and established clarity by the U.S. to defend 
sensitive and careful intelligence methods and sources, it would provide United States nationwide interests by:- 
(Zenko, 2013). 
1. Allowing policymakers and diplomats to paint a more accurate portrayal of drones to counter the 
myths and misperceptions that currently remain unaddressed due to secrecy concerns; 
2. Placing the use of drones as a counterterrorism tactic on a more legitimate and defensible footing 
with domestic and international audiences; 
3. Increasing the likelihood that the U.S. will sustain the international tolerance and cooperation 
required to carry out future drone strikes, such as intelligence support and host-state basing rights; 
4. Exerting a normative influence on the policies and actions of other states; and 
5. Providing current and future U.S. administrations with the requisite political leverage to shape and 
promote responsible use of drones by other states and nonstate actors. 
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In 2013, U.S. President officially acknowledged that U.S. had been taking “lethal targeting action against 
terrorists, its associated forces and especially to Al Qaida by using drone strikes and these activities are legal and 
effective (Obama, 2013). 
Although U.S., in these countries (i.e. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen) and other theater countries would be 
exercises their “self-defense immanent right” against Al Qaida and other non-state actors as shown in United 
Nation (UN) Charter article 51 (Orr, 2011). U.S. President Obama stated that under international and domestic 
law, we are at war with Taliban, Al Qaida and their associated allies, the war waged corresponding and 
proportionally, in final option, and in self-defense. 
Harold Hongu Koh the legal adviser of U.S. Department restated this position in language of unmistakable at 
annual meeting of international law held in Washington on 2010, Koh affirmed that, “as the issue of international 
rule, the U.S. is fighting the armed war with Taliban, their associated forces and Al Qaida, to response of 9/11 
attacks, and can use the army consistent with their inherent right under international law for self-defense (Koh, 
2010). So, from the U.S.A perspective, international human rights law applies to their conflict with terrorists and 
Al Qaeda allies. Thus the means that international humanitarian law should be legally for assessing the 
American’s lawfulness drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan. Besides, if the U.S.A not in frames of an armed war 
towards Al Qaida and terrorists in FATA (Northwest Pakistan) so that the application of said law example to the 
particulars should be regulating the conclusions into lawful. It is more difficult to justify and defend of U.S. 
drone strikes on Pakistan under international humanitarian law, as the said law needed those territories to 
exercise the forces as previous resort, “to defend against specific, solid and forthcoming threats of seriously 
physically injury or death (Tomuschat et al, 2010). 
In more ruling, according to Cole that drones are used in three different groups:  First, when attacks of ground 
troops or they become under attacks so that armed drone strikes can be used on other militants, military aircrafts 
or terrorists; Secondly, drones mostly are used for surveillance in sky of any country to observe the people’s 
routine life; And thirdly, drones are used in designed missions or plans to kill the terrorists or militants (Cole, 
2010). 
First, the utilizing of these drone have little difference with other weapons, comprise with traditional manned 
airplane, under the umbrella of international law: the use of drone will not be lawful on international human right 
law parameters. Second use of surveillance, drone need did not even be armed and only play for surveillance 
purpose. Principally, this may not have any human rights law implication, but does concerned to sovereignty, 
domination and private matters among others. So as in third one, it seems most important cause of drone’s 
technology and where the focal point of legality and legitimacy has been shed upon. To direct killing of anyone 
is illegal or legal (commonly illegal) irrespectively of the means used; but armed drones actually makes it easier 
to killing and murder of humans in remote areas has created and established a powerful connection between 
targeted killing and drones that concerned with both humanitarian law and international human rights (Alston, 
2010). 
It also has a great depth that Pakistani Minister Khar’s criticism of U.S. strikes in FATA region in 2011 was 
phrased in the armed conflict language: She stated that “such drone strikes in Pakistan comprise the troubles and 
also create issues towards humanitarian law and human rights. Unlawful and reckless conduct of drone strikes 
cannot be justified anywhere by U.S. or any other authority in the world (Ministry, 2011). 
Also number of scholars and researchers have raised a lot of arguments for the illegality and unlawful of U.S. 
drone attacks on Pakistan. First, terrorism is a law enforcement matter but not military matter (Mary, 2010). 
Secondly, drone strikes are also violation of territorial sovereignty and supremacy of Pakistan, a state that is not 
involved with U.S. in armed conflict (Shah, 2010). Furthermore, the drone strikes on Pakistan don’t meet the 
requirements of UN charter on self-defense (United Nation, 51), as international Court of Justice interpreted and 
usually international law (Shah, 2010). 
As per history point of view, the Security Council (S.C) has passed various resolutions and rules to holding 
terrorist activities as threats to security and international peace (Gray, 2008). It has criticized acts of  terrorism  
and  called  upon  countries to  refrain  and desist from  providing  to support  or any kind of assistance to 
terrorist  groups,  suppress  and  prevent  terrorist  activities, affairs and also their financing, and energetically 
coordinate  with each other to  suppress  acts  of their terrorism emergence within their areas and borders 
(Security Council Resolution, 53). However, S.C., no resolution has affirmed or declared the right to use armed 
against another country under the umbrella of counterterrorism (Gray, 2008).         
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3.2 Legitimacy of United States Drone Attacks in Pakistan 
The emergence of U.S.A’s war on terrorism in Afghanistan gets an end of Taliban’s Government in the Afghan 
territory but not the insurgencies. As a resultant, Afghanistan has become the state of anarchism with the 
influence of American-instituted Afghanistan regime limited within Kabul city. NATO and U.S. allies’ forces 
failed to control in any part of Afghanistan. Consequently, the country was flooded with millions of radical 
troops from Middle East, Central Asia and other various parts of world whom perceive the region as religious 
and spiritual battle zone and also relish the opportunities to fight against the west (Crews, 2009). Due to border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan , the U.S.A asserts that various such troops usually flees towards Pakistan’s 
frontier region where the terrorists feel safe haven and also be helped by tribal communities (Crews, 2009). 
Furthermore, U.S. and NATO claimed that various local fighters and troops from Pakistani tribal areas engaged 
with NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan (Crews, 2009). The actuality of these argues is challengeable to few, 
but irrespective and whatever of that determination, one object is for convinced: the war against terrorism has 
spilled and overturned into Pakistan (Hasan, 2009). Beside, the Taliban and terrorists consistent with ethnic 
group of Pashtun establish at Pakistan and Afghanistan boundaries. Whereas the Afghan terrorists were quite 
gigantic group so as presently Pakistani various terrorist organizations exist which is communally known as 
terrorist groups. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is most important which is known largest terrorist group in 
Pakistan and also safe haven for Talibans in the Pakistan region (FATA Area). TTP is also mostly vigorous in 
terrorism activities in Pakistan territory. Not only TTP is so theater for Pakistan but a further main group is 
Haqqani faction who create disturbance in FATA (Pakistan Area) and this group also participated in different 
terrorism activities in Afghan region (Jaeger, 2012). All of these circumstances, one should analyze the 
consequence and legality of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. 
3.3 Pak-U.S. Internal Narrative on Drone Strikes in Pakistan 
The history and narrative of drone strikes by U.S. in Pakistan is very complicated. A number of researchers and 
historians showed that although civilians opposed the U.S drone programme in Pakistan due to causalities and 
heavy damaging of their property but in secretly government and Pak Army support this. 
In 2004 when drone strikes began to targeted militants in FATA region (Pakistan); at that time Pakistan army 
granted permission to U.S. for using of Shami and Shahbaz air basis in Pakistan. These were supposedly also 
used by the U.S. to conduct drone strikes and collect intelligence (Woods, 2011). Initially Pakistan appeared to 
help the U.S. in drone attacks covertly. From 2004 to till 2007, government of Pakistan claimed responsibility of 
these strikes that had been conducted by U.S., thus asked the CIA to deny any permission and involvement 
(Williams, 2009). According to Shah:- 
“The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousuf Raza Gilani, has on numerous occasions officially condemned 
such attacks, and has termed them a violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan and a dangerous course of 
action that fuels militarism. He has urged the U.S. administration to immediately bring a halt to halt such 
operations (Shah, 2010).” 
It is ambiguity that the Government of Pakistan consent needed an unambiguous, if not formal and written, 
agreement. It did not look the case in Pakistan, where “while various reports claimed that Pakistan had secretly 
backed to these operations and permitted to use their air fields. While the Prime Minister of Pakistan denied such 
agreement between Pak and U.S. (Shah, 2010). According to Down newspaper, in 2009 meeting with Codel 
Leahy, Asif Ali Zardari (President of Pakistan) said that drone program be given to government of Pakistan to 
control by Pakistan Military so that we cannot be criticized by their media (Patterson , 2009). 
There are abundant evidences by the Pakistani officials’ tacit permission and cooperation with U.S. authorities 
since 2004. In 2008 and 2010, Prime Minister of Pakistan Gilani disclosed that Musharraf’s regime had 
authorized drone strikes to U.S. (Express, 2010). Also Musharraf himself acknowledged in 2013 during media 
interview that his administration has privately agreed on the drone strikes of United States (Robertson, 2013). 
During 2004-2007 Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Pervez Kayani also coordinated with U.S. on drone strikes even 
after Musharraf’s regime (Hameed, 2013). According to Zaidi Hasan that Pakistan’s military and civil authorities 
had supported to U.S. on drone operations. So that in 2008, during presidential elections, Chief of Army Staff 
Ashfaq Pervez requested to United States officials for provision of drone coverage in FATA area of Pakistan 
(Zaidi, 2011). In 2009 confidential cable by American embassy affirmed that Kayani “well knows that drone 
attacks have been explicit (making some civilians deaths) and killing basically at foreign fighters in FATA, 
Waziristan (Zaidi, 2011). 
All the previous study and analyses showed that Pak Army position towards U.S. strikes reflects the haziness of 
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their connections towards Taliban. An informed observer said that “The reality is that Pakistan Army wants both, 
the safe havens for terrorists and also U.S. drone attacks on them (Sethi, 2012). 
4. Drones Strike’s Implications on Terrorists and Particularly on Pakistan        
Drone strikes have started in FATA Pakistan from 2004 to present date but there is not excellent public 
information and data avail about how many drone attacks have been taken place, what number of peoples have 
been wounded and killed by them and what political and social outcome have resulted accurately. Various public 
studies and researches contradict to each other or current data and conclusions or results that are difficult to 
reconcile. Because drone strikes data is so inconclusive, the need for dialog with public and judgments are 
greater than ever. In this part of study we will discuss on drone strike’s effects on Pakistan with different 
perspectives. 
4.1 Drone Strikes and Terrorists 
In history mirror, it has been seen that drone strikes have key effects in increasing of terrorist attacks, suicide 
bombing and also other terrorist activities in Pakistan. Even though drone strikes have achieved gigantic goals 
against terrorism.  
Drone attacks are associated among 24% reduce in terrorists attacks; 22% decrease in the use of Improvised 
Explosive Device (IEDs); 16% reduce lethality of these attack and probably 32% reduction of suicide bombing 
(Johnston, 2013). These results at least suggested that drone strikes have reduced terrorist attacks in a current 
civil war. Beside, various studies showed the increasing in terrorist’s attacks in Pakistan.  
First of all it was a big achievement in first strike in Pakistan, for instance, and the killing of Nek Muhammad on 
June 2004, the key leader of an insurgency in FATA Pakistan. Officials had accused that Wazir Muhammad was 
harbored figure of Taliban and Al Qaeda (Khan, 2004). Although during drone strikes in FATA Pakistan, a 
number of high ranking terrorists and including Al Qaida leaders, Mustafa Abu Yazid the chief finance officer of 
Al Qaida, Sheikh Fateh al Masri, Qari Muhammad Zafar most wanted by U.S. for his suspected involvement in 
attacks on U.S. consulate in Karachi Pakistan, Mustafa al Jaziri who was also a seiner member of Al Qaida, other 
terrorists wanted by U.S. for their suspected involvement in bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 
during 1998, Baitullah Mehsud leader of TTP have been killed (Bill, 2013). Whatever the program of drone 
strike is short and success is also so medium, its effectiveness in militant networking degrading in the lengthy is 
doubtful at best. Terrorist commanding vacuums are not left long unfilled. Abu Laith al-Libi, for example, was 
killed on 2008 in drone strike who was the third of command of Al Qaida; In 2011 killed a second in command 
of Al Qaida, Ariyah Abd al-Rahman; Within year in June 4, 2012, Abu Yahya al-Libi, a new Al Qaida’s second in 
command, was killed by the U.S.; At about three year later Mustafa Abu al-Yazid was killed by drone strike who 
was also a Al Qaida successor. 
For terrorists and their leaders, the appearance of drones over the battleground has also interrupted their current 
activities. “Life in a cave," written one enthusiast of airpower, “is no high life casino (Peck, 1928). These strikes 
may also create a wedge between terrorist and the public by brightly underscoring the counterterrorist's power to 
hurt and the lack of insurgent symmetrical reaction. Officials of Obama administration stated that U.S. 
eliminated at least top 20 leaders of Al Qaida from 2009 to 2012 in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Reuters, 2012). 
Only in Pakistan, as per New American Foundation, fifty eight of Al-Qaida affiliated and terrorist leaders were 
killed in Pakistan by U.S. drone strikes during 2004 to 2013 (New America Foundation, 2014). Drone strikes 
also killed various high level Afghan and Pakistani terrorists and leaders of Al Qaida. In 2009, leader of TTP 
Baitullah Mehsud was killed; on January 2013, Pakistani Taliban’s suicide wing head Wali Mohammed Toofan 
was killed; Haqqani network’s third in command Badruddin Haqqani was killed in August 2012 and Ilyas 
Kashmiri of Harkatul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) was killed in June 2011; Maulvi Nazir Wazir another TTP 
commander ‘for example’ was killed in drone attack in FATA Pakistan on January 2, 2013 (New America 
Foundation, 2014). Drone strikes have thus rather disrupted and disturbed the capability of Waziristan-based 
regional and international terrorists for planning and attacking on American and their allies’ forces in 
Afghanistan and Afghani terrorists beyond the boundaries and also these strikes affected on terrorists in Pakistan 
region. Ex-Britain official stated that U.S. drone strikes in FATA area of Pakistan and Yemen showed the 
considerable effects on militant’s attacks towards European countries and United Kingdom (Ravi, 2013). 
Drone strikes have key effects on insurgents, for instance, documents received from Osama bin Laden’s 
compound Pakistan where Osama Bin Laden advised to members of Al Qaida to move to Kunar the province of 
Afghanistan for protection from drone strikes (Combating Terrorism Center, 2014). And also several of Al Qaida 
and Afghan militants have been arrested and captured in Baluchistan (province of Pakistan) since 2009, when the 
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drone strikes in FATA Pakistan escalated.  
Although these are the biggest achievements against the counterterrorism due to drone strikes but as the 
retaliation, Pakistan has suffered the different problems as suicide bombing and other kind of terrorism by 
terrorists. 
4.2 Retaliation by Militants  
When we see to back in history of drone attacks and terrorist’s attacks in Pakistan, we have found that drone and 
terrorists attacks have closely impact on each others. David’s report that here is a considerable effect of drone 
attacks on Al Qaeda and Taliban violations in Pakistani region. They have founded in their research that 
continually drone attacks increased the terrorist’s attacks in Pakistan and have a strong impact on Al Qaida and 
Taliban attacks in Pakistan (Jaeger, 2012). 
Even the key terrorist member have been killed by the U.S. drone attacks, but the use of drones are disliked in 
Pakistani territory because of civilian deaths and others damages, furthermore, conceivable retaliation against 
civil population by the terrorists. For instance, in the suicide attacking on Police academy at Lahore Pakistan 
during 2009, in which eighteen peoples were killed, the chief leader of TTP Baitullah Mehsud declared that 
“suicide attack on police academy at Lahore was in revenge of U.S. strikes in Pakistan (BBC, 2009). 
Before 2004, there is no any kind of suicide attacks in Pakistan but after the binging of drone strikes this 
counterterrorism (suicide attacks) have also increased; On February 2, 2013, for instance, terrorists attack on 
military check post in Khyber Pakhtoons Khaw, province of Pakistan, neighboring to FATA which resulted the 
killing of 24 people. Declared credit, the Taliban of Pakistan stated that attack was meant as retaliation and 
reaction in Pakistani cooperation with NATO and U.S. on drone program (Tribune, 2013). 
According to study of Living Under Drone, although the drone attack’s frequency increased by U.S. as a 
retaliation the militants attacks by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban have also been increased (Living Under Drones, 
2014). The real benefit is going to radical groups, as well as in the forms of recruiting of new militants. A 
researcher comprehensively investigation on governance and security into Southern Areas of Pakistan and he 
stated that whereas anti-strikes oratory should draw various exchanges, “the death of Qari Hussain or other key 
leaders is much more loss than the recruitment of various foot recruits (Hameed, 2013).” 
In the same way, in bomb case on Jun, 2010, Faisal Shahzad (Pakistani American) stated to judge in court that he 
placed a bomb at Times Square as retaliation of U.S. activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and also their 
international usage of drone attacks. On asking of judge about killing of innocent civilians, he replied: ‘Well, the 
drone strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan killed the lot of innocents and they also did not care anybody (Shifrel et al, 
2010). So the attack in United States by Faisal Shahzad in U.S. and other terrorist’s attacks in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and also in U.S can be retaliation on the usage of drone attacks in Pakistan, Afghan territory and 
somewhere else was not accepted. Therefore, it should be expected that drone strikes have associated with 
increased militant’s attacks. 
5.  Drone Strikes and Its Economical, Psychological, Social and Political Effects on Pakistan 
Drones can hover and fly for days and hours over an area to collect information that operators used to recognize 
their objectives, strikes and get the instant impact of an attack; According to various researches and interviews, 
while a drone hover in the sky, uncertainly, that it should attack understandably provokes fear among peoples of 
FATA (Living Under Drones, 2014). Most of peoples of Northern areas of Pakistan considered those local 
reporters, giving information and also fitting some chips for drone’s guidance towards potential terrorist targets; 
destabilize the security of their peoples. Terrorists punished the suspected informants into coerced confessions, 
and mostly release videos and photos to warn their peoples on cooperation with the NATO and United States 
(Express, 2013). It is although a big psychological effect on the peoples of that region.  
The number of studies showed that drone attacks approach hinders the culture of FATA and activities of war, for 
instance, by leading to the striking of Jirgas in FATA area. It is asserted that leader of tribal area currently 
distressed to holding the Jirgas (Living Under Drones, 2014). For example, in March 17, 2011 the strike on a 
tribal Jirgas in Datta Khel in North Waziristan, only 4 were terrorists but 40 peoples were killed (Shah, 2012). 
Beside, in political point of view, drone strikes have key effects to destabilizing the politics of Pakistan. 
Government and civilians everyone is worried about drone strikes. According to a study, former President Asif 
Ali Zardari said to General David Petraeus in a meeting that ‘continuing drone strikes on Pakistan, which results 
in loss of causalities and financial damages are difficult to make clear by the democratic administration. Also this 
kind of activities is generating a credibility gap (Williams, 2010). 
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Government of Pakistan is in critical situation due to the growing of big hostility towards U.S. drone attacks. The 
U.S. drone policy is becoming the dangerous day-to-day for Pakistan; According to a Pew study, only seventeen 
per cent civilians support the drone attacks against terrorists, even the strikes conducted with the government 
support (Pew, 2012). This is rising anti-American emotions peaked in October 2012, during the Imran Khan’s 
protesting march against United States, in which millions of protesters attempt to go inside the FATA areas where 
mostly U.S. drones were attacks (Masood, 2012). After a reviewing of U.S. and Pakistan relationship, the 
Pakistan’s National Assembly insists the United States to stop their strikes and every kind of war in the region 
(Walsh, 2012). 
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